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Research into the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the 
availability of data. Although bid-ask spreads were inaccessible to 
researchers, Roll  (1984) provided a conceptual model that 
estimated the effective bid-ask prices from regular time series data, 
recorded on a daily or longer interval. Later data availability 
improved and researchers were able to address questions 
regarding the factors that influenced the spreads and the 
relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity.  More 
recently transaction data have been used to measure the effective 
spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of 
liquidity to include the impact of transactions on price movements 
(Clayton and McKinnon, 2000) on a trade-by-trade analysis. This 
paper aims to use techniques that combine elements from all three 
approaches and, by studying US data over a relatively long time 
period, to throw light on earlier research as well as to reveal the 
changes in liquidity over the period controlling for extraneous 
factors such as market, age and size of REIT. It also reveals some 
comparable results for the UK market over the same period.
3 We would like to thank Chris Brooks, Dennis Capozza, Patric Hendershott, Robert Van Order and 
the participants at the Conference in Honor of the Scholarly Contribution of Patric H. Hendershott 
(Ohio State University) and seminar participants at the University of Reading and University of 
Cambridge. 2
1. Introduction 
Research into the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the availability of 
data. Historically, even bid-ask spreads were inaccessible to researchers, 
Roll (1984) provided a conceptual model that estimated the effective bid-ask prices 
from regular time series data, recorded on a daily or longer interval. Later data 
availability improved and researchers were able to address questions regarding the 
factors that influenced the spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, 
return and liquidity.  More recently transaction data have been used to measure the 
effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity 
to include the impact of transactions on price movements (Clayton and McKinnon, 
2000) on a trade-by-trade analysis. This paper aims to use techniques that 
combine elements from all three approaches and, by studying US data over a 
relatively long time period, to throw light on earlier research as well as to reveal the 
changes in liquidity over the period controlling for extraneous factors such as 
market, age and size of REIT. 
2. Previous Research 
Liquidity and its antithesis, illiquidity, have been extensively studied in equity 
markets. It can be argued that illiquidity influences expected returns, either 
because investors may be prepared to pay a premium for liquid stocks when the 
market is down (Chordia et al [2000], [2001]), or because in different phases of 
markets, investors perceive liquidity as a source of additional returns (see Acharya 
and Pedersen [2005], Amihud [2002]). 
The connection between liquidity and the bid-ask spread is similarly well 
established since the larger the spread, the more expensive trading in the stock 
would be. And this, in turn, would imply that investors would be inhibited in 
exploiting perceived mis-pricing or minor adjustments to their portfolio position.   
Correspondingly as greater uncertainty arises about future prices, Bollerslev and 3
Melvin (1994) showed that the spread would increase in the foreign exchange 
markets. In other markets similar results have been demonstrated by Boothe 
(1988), Gwilym, Clare and Thomas (1998).  
However it can also be seen that the size of the bid-ask spread is only one 
component of liquidity: Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) argue that the spread 
only accounts for the inventory costs which have to be relatively minor when 
compared with other costs of market making. For example, the depth of the market 
would affect the capacity of investors to trade since a market lacking depth would 
result in prices moving away from investors seeking to trade in larger quantities as 
the market makers adjusted their bid-ask prices, even though the spread might 
remain unchanged – Kyle (1985). Investors would therefore become aware that 
trading would be difficult in any large quantities in markets that lacked depth and 
might build in a risk premium to adjust for this source of risk. In this framework, the 
bid-ask spread is reflecting the tightness aspect, that is, the spread is only giving 
some indication of the transaction costs in a short-term round trip. Studies of the 
bid-ask spread have therefore assumed away the substantial minority of 
transactions that have taken place either within the spread or, perhaps for large 
trades, outside the quoted spread. 
In an early study of liquidity and the bid-ask spread, Roll (1984) without access to 
the bid-ask spread data suggested that they could be estimated by reference to the 
serial-correlation of price changes (returns) on aggregated transactions. Roll’s 
example used daily data and showed that the covariance between successive 
price changes depended, not on the flow of new information, but on the spread.  
Briefly, we can achieve an intuitive understanding of the model if  we consider the 
path of three successive trades: Starting with an investor buying (at the market 
maker’s offer price), the next trade could take place either at the market maker’s 
bid or offer price. The following trade could likewise be at the market maker’s bid or 
offer price. The relationship between successive price changes in these 
transactions would only be positive if successive trades caused the market maker 4
to alter the bid-offer spread. In the absence of such movement, there could only be 
a negative (or zero) relationship between price changes if a buy order were 
followed by a sell order (or vice versa). Arguing that in an efficient market, the 
market maker would only change the bid-offer price at random intervals, Roll thus 
argued that the only systematic relationship between successive changes had to 
come from the occurrences of buy-sell or sell-buy orders. 
He thus derived the relationship between the covariance of successive price 
changes and the spread, and showed that the sum of the spread components had 
exactly the same distribution as an individual component and that the covariance 
was independent of the number of periods (transactions) within the measurement 
interval. Thus average spreads could be estimated indirectly from the following: 
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s  represents the average squared spread during the sample period of 
length τ, and pt represents the stock price at time t.  Of course this is a weak 
relationship since often buy (sell) orders will be followed by other buy (sell) orders 
and furthermore with thinly traded stocks, market movements may take time to be 
reflected in individual stock prices (causing a positive serial correlation in interval-
based returns) but Roll’s approach has been adopted as a standard technique to 
measure spreads. A recent example is Capozza, Hendershott and Mack (2004) in 
assessing the bid-ask spread in US stocks. 
3. Derivation of Research Model 
In assessing the behaviour of stock-liquidity, Clayton and McKinnon (2000) 
(hereafter C&M) concentrated their analysis on the impact of trades and looked at 
the change in stock price associated with the size of trade. This was a powerful 5
approach to the problem, enabled by the researchers’ access to trade-by-trade 
data. Our approach starts by examining the C&M model when applied to daily 
intervals rather than to trade by trade data. 
The C&M model assumes a linear relationship between the change of price 
between two successive trades and (a) the volume of shares traded and (b) the 
difference between the direction of successive trades – see Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996). This latter variable reflects the effective spread – if 
successive trades are in the same direction (e.g. a retail buyer initiated), the 
computed difference would be zero but if the directions were different the variable 
would be either +2 or -2. The price change in the changed case would therefore 
reflect (half) the effective price change between the market maker’s bid and offer 
prices. On the question of volume, their model implies that a large buy order would 
shift market makers’ prices upwards whilst small orders would have less effect.  
Algebraically the relationship on a trade-by-trade basis is represented by  
t t t t t t t I I Q I P P ε φ λ + − + = − − − ) ( 1 1             (2) 
Where :    λ = market depth or inverse liquidity parameter 
   φ = the effective transaction cost of the transaction 
   Qt = the volume of stock traded 
   It = Direction Indicator where: 
               It = 1 for retail investor’s initiated buy and 
               It = -1 for retail investor’s initiated sell transaction.
In this formulation, the lower the impact of large trades, the more liquid would be 
the market. Thus over time, if the market were to become more liquid and deeper, 
it would be reflected in the estimated λ falling. C&M found that for their sample 
covering REITs in 1993 and 1996 that indeed the market became more liquid in 
1996 than it had been in 1993.  However as shown in equation (2), they were also 
testing for the effective bid-ask spread by the φ parameter and on the whole 6
sample of REITs they were unable to find evidence that it had changed significantly 
between 1993 and 1996. They also identified that the changes in liquidity were 
most strikingly obvious in those REITs that were or became self advised and 
managed.  
C&M inferred that their study had shown the value of trade-by-trade data and their 
results advanced the study of liquidity assessment significantly. However what 
remains unknown is whether their results derive entirely from the use of the 
disaggregated data or whether the changes in liquidity and market changes would 
have been revealed in traditional methods and data sources. 
In our sample we are using daily returns and daily transaction volume so a natural 
approach is to ask what would happen if we were to take the aggregate of daily 
trades using the above formulation. 
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Summing equation (2) over the number of trades per day we derive equation (3) 
and we find that the LHS equals the price change (or return) over the day, the first 
variable on the RHS sums to the total net trade in the day and the second term 
represents the sum of transactions indicators. Since every transaction apart from 
the first and last appears twice with the opposite sign, all intermediate transaction 
indicators cancel except for the first and last. The term therefore does not have 
economic significance when aggregated. 
Many of the studies of market liquidity have focused on the role of market makers 
and the bid-ask spread – see Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Glosten and 
Harris (1988), and of course Stoll (1989). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) look at the 
role of the specialists in a competitive market and argue that the market value (if 
information were widely available) would be within the bid-ask spread and that the 7
spread is limited by the need to attract liquidity traders (i.e. depth providing 
investors) but is increased if the supply of insider information increases.  
In this case, however, we are looking at the operation of the market including the 
contribution of other investors. Agents may act as intermediaries and match trades 
between their clients, orders may be held up by dealing desks in investing 
institutions leading to unfilled orders that have to completed by close of trading, 
day-traders may lead to trend-following behaviour in trades and other institutional 
investors may be holding limit orders not passed onto the market maker. In other 
words, the liquidity of the market depends on much more than the trade-by-trade 
behaviour of any formal market maker. Efficient price behaviour will require deep 
and wide markets involving different types of investor standing ready to trade at or 
near the current market price. Only in such markets would we expect prices to 
adjust quickly to new information. Some information will reach all investors at or 
about the same time so the price of the stocks may be expected to move quickly 
with or without trading. Volume of trade will, in those instances, carry little or no 
information about the significance or the cause of the price change. In other cases, 
some investors may trade on the basis of more information than other investors (or 
with different expectations). In a market which has depth and is operationally 
efficient, such investors can trade stock at or about the current price since there 
are buyers and sellers standing ready to trade just above and just below the last 
traded price – see Holthausen et al. (1987). 
In terms of simple market economics, we can envisage a highly elastic demand 
curve for stock at the current price – some of which is provided by the market 
maker but the bulk of which is provided by other investors in the market. If the 
market lacks depth, investors wishing to trade will find that the price has to move 
more to encourage buyers or sellers. By analogy, they will face a downward 
demand curve if they wish to sell and an upward sloping supply curve if they wish 
to buy. This suggests that depth in the market will allow investors to trade without 
the market price changing whilst information flows may result in price changes 8
without significant trading. The slope of the demand/supply curve will reflect the 
effective depth of the market.  
Diagrammatically we can represent this model as Figure 1 below.    
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ] 
Algebraically we can represent these functions as two linear equations with 
different intercepts and slopes. This allows us to hypothesise a relationship of the 
form: 
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where Dup and Ddown are dummies that reflect whether the market price has risen 
or fallen during the day. In this model, market-wide information that is not 
accompanied by systematic trading is captured in the constant α0 and the residual 
error terms  t ε . Note that the first intercept term is not redundant because it reflects 
the returns on days on which no trade takes place.  
The upside and downside price changes are given respectively by equations (5) 
and (6:) 
() t t t Q r ε λ λ α α + + + + = ∑ 1 0 1 0      (5) 
() t t t Q r ε λ λ α α + + + + = ∑ 2 0 2 0            (6) 
where and rt = α0 when Q t  = 0. 
In this formulation, we are measuring the gross trade on the assumption that the 
market makers are not systematically adding to or reducing their inventory. We 9
recognise that this is an empirical assumption that will not hold in the very short 
term but, over sufficiently long series of trades, it becomes a reasonable working 
assumption. 
The slopes represent the market depth (λi) in that the smaller the absolute slope, 
the more liquid the market is and the more stock the market can absorb or supply 
at a price that does not differ much from the current price. The intercept terms (αi) 
provide some insight into the transaction costs in the market since the sum of the 
absolute values of the α show the minimum difference between buy and sell 
orders. They thus correspond to the estimate by C&M of the transaction costs
4 and 
we therefore use the symbol α to refer to the sum of the absolute values of the 
intercepts. However, we also incorporate Roll’s estimator by including a lagged 
term in returns (change in prices) from which we can estimate the covariance 
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where rt  represents the (log) of daily price changes, and ρ is the coefficient from 
which the serial covariance can be estimated – see Capozza, Hendershott and 
Mack (2004). We note that the inclusion of the lagged returns does not influence 
the estimation of the other coefficients (please see Figures 4 and 5 below). 
We run yearly regressions on daily observations for each company showing at 
least 60 data points. We only report annual average estimates of coefficients, 
along with the R
2 of the regression and the number of REITs  available in that 
particular year. If all REITs show a full time series for all variables, the maximum 
4 Actually the estimate here should be less than the C&M estimate since their parameter applies to 
those trades where at least one more order is executed and therefore will represent the average 
transaction unit of volume. 10
number of regressions would be 2,392 for the overall sample (184 REITs * 13 
years).  
4. Data 
Daily price indexes and trading volumes of 184 REITs were obtained from SNL 
Financials, which also provided REITs characteristics (e.g. stock exchange). Bid 
and ask prices were recorded from Reuters for a smaller sample of US REITs 
which we use only for comparative purposes. 
The bid-ask spread for REIT i at time t has been subsequently obtained as follows: 
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where PBi,t and PAi,t respectively represent the bid and ask price for company i at 
time t. 
Table 1 contains main descriptive statistics for price changes and trading volumes.  
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
5. Observations and Hypotheses 
Real estate sector returns are illustrated in Figure 2, showing the relative 
performance of the sample of REITS in comparison with the overall equity market. 
As can be seen, the REIT’s relative performance improved from 1994 and 
continued to out-perform the rest of the market until 2000 when it fell both relatively 
and absolutely until the end of 2002. Thereafter, it performed pretty much in line 
with the rest of the equity market until the end of 2005. 11
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ] 
Turning to the reported spreads, in Figure 3 we show the reported spreads for 
REITs from 1991 onwards. The striking feature for the market is the peak in 1993. 
This appears consistent with the finding of C&M that liquidity had increased 
between 1993 and 1996. In fact the change appears to have taken place early in 
that interval because reported spreads fell sharply in 1994.  
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ] 
From previous research, the received view is that, after a rise at the end of the 
1980s, spreads fell in the 1990s [Nelling et al. (1995)]. However, it was also shown 
that from 1993 to 1996 REITs spreads fell, not because there was a general 
reduction in REIT spreads, but because new REITs appeared on the market and 
they were more marketable and more liquid than the old REITs – see Cole (1998). 
The new REITS had significantly lower spreads than the old ones and that 
therefore the effect was to lower the average spread on REITs.  
From the previous work and from the above discussion we therefore would expect 
to observe the following: 
Market Depth 1993 onward: The slopes (which reflects the inverse of the market 
depth) of the positive return days should be positive and the negative return days 
should be negative. The slopes would become flatter (reflecting increasing market 
depth) from 1993 to 1996 and later as the REIT market continued to develop and 
expand.  
Roll Estimate and Reported Spread: The Roll estimated effective spreads should 
be positively related to the spreads reported by Reuters. 12
Market Depth (λ) and Reported Spreads (or Roll Estimates): The estimates of 
market depth, from equation (7), would be related to the bid-ask spreads reported 
by Reuters or the Roll estimates. 
Illiquidity Costs (α α α α) and Reported Spreads (or Roll Estimates): The estimates 
of illiquidity costs (represented by the sum of the absolute values of the intercepts) 
from equation (7), would be related to the bid-ask spreads reported by Reuters
5 or 
the Roll estimates. 
New vs. Old REITS: There should be more liquidity for the new REITs introduced 
in the market post-1993  
NYSE vs. other markets: The NYSE should be more liquid than the other markets 
(ASE and NASDAQ)
6. In exploring this question, we have to deal with the 
complication that large cap REITs would be expected to be more liquid than small 
cap REITs and that the market effect might therefore be confused with a size 
effect. We therefore include in our analysis some further exploration of the size and 
market effects. 
6. Regression Results
Before reporting the results of the model regressions, we should consider 
alternative inferences of the regressions. For example, we are regressing the 
returns on volume, but it might be thought that the direction of influence is from 
returns to volume. Might not changes in the prices lead to more trade taking place? 
In support of our interpretation, Clark (1973), Karpoff (1987), Tauchen and Pitts 
(1983) argue for trading volume proxying for the flow of new information and the 
5 Glosten and Harris (1998); Lin et al. (1995). 
6 Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997); Chan and Lakonishok (1997); Huang R.D. and Stoll H.R. 
(1996). 13
level of disagreement between traders (which we identify with market depth).  For 
an interesting extension of their work, see Rodgers, Satchell and Yoon (2001).  
Notwithstanding the thrust of previous research, as a precautionary step, we first 
conduct Granger causality tests on the individual stock returns / trading volume 
data. The results showed little of significance. Overall, of the 2762 Granger 
regression tests, 12.9% suggested that daily volume Granger-caused daily returns 
whilst 9.7% suggested that daily returns Granger-caused daily volume (at the 95% 
confidence level). Only in 1995, was it found that there were more instances of 
returns Granger-causing volume (14.8%) than volume causing returns (11.5%). 
These results also argue against momentum-trading effects since momentum 
trading would cause volume to rise in response to price changes. The Granger-
causality results suggest that this was not a dominant issue that affected stock 
prices in the sample used in this study. We take up the issue of momentum trading 
later when discussing the Roll-estimating procedure. 
Market Depth 1993 onward
Table 2 summarises the results of the regression shown in Equation (7) for each 
year from 1993 to 2005 for our sample of US REITs. The slopes are correctly 
signed. There is a trend over time of the intercepts becoming closer to each other, 
implying improving liquidity in the market. However the positive slope diminishes 
sharply for 1993 and 1994 whilst increasing again in 1999, 2000 and 2004. This 
would be consistent with the liquidity of the market improving in the early 1990s 
whilst deteriorating in the later years since larger volumes would have been 
associated with larger price changes. 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ] 
Although there is substantial variation between the regression results for each 
company, the strength of the regressions is clearly indicated by the average 
adjusted R
2 for the regressions which are all larger than 55%. The daily data are 14
noisy and we would not expect the regressions to explain variation in returns very 
strongly. We calculated the proportion of significant estimates for this regression 
and show the results in Table 3. It is interesting that in the early part of the period, 
the results were strongly significant in the majority of cases. As time progressed, 
the slopes of the regressions decreased and thus it is not surprising that the 
proportion of significant parameters also declined. This is consistent with 
increasing liquidity (lower slopes) as the market develops. 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ] 
We also show Figures 4 and 5 which summarise the average parameter estimates 
per year obtained either including – equation (7) – or excluding – equation (4) – the 
autoregressive parameter. The graphs show the AR parameter is not significantly 
changing the results (with the exception of 1993, where the sign and magnitude of 
the slope is nevertheless more than acceptable).  
[ INSERT FIGURES 4 & 5 HERE ] 
Roll Estimate and Reported Spread: 
The relationship between the reported spreads and the estimated spreads using 
the Roll’s procedure on the AR parameter estimate in equation (7) is shown in 
Figure 6. The downward movement is clearly revealed between 1993 and 1994 in 
both series with the Roll estimator, which is a measure of effective spread being, 
as expected, much smaller than the reported spreads. It is also important to note 
that the Roll estimator implies a negative covariance between successive period 
returns. The existence of plausible numbers for Roll’s estimator confirms the 
absence of positive serial correlation of returns and suggests the absence of 
momentum-based trading. 
[ INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE ] 15
Market Depth and Reported Spread  
Turning to our measure of market depth, we represent the liquidity of the market by 
the difference between the slopes of the regressions (or alternatively the sum of 
the absolute values of the slopes), reasoning that if the slopes became steeper, it 
would imply less liquidity so the sum of the absolute values of the slopes would 
reflect increasing or decreasing liquidity. The results of the regression are reported 
in Table 4. As can be seen, there is a strong positive and significant relationship 
between the two estimates which is consistent with our expected relationship.  
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ] 
New vs. Old REITS
The next issue that concerns us is the liquidity of the new and old REITs. Dividing 
our sample into the REITs that existed before 1993 and those that have appeared 
since that year, we ran the regression – equation (7) – for both samples. The signs 
of all the liquidity parameters were as expected. Furthermore the intercepts for old 
REITs are always outside those for new REITs, whilst the slopes for old REITs are 
always steeper than those for new REITs throughout the period (please see Tables 
5 and 6). 
Furthermore, consistent with prior research, if it is the old REITs that have shown 
such variation over the period in liquidity, new REITs have been more liquid and 
less affected by year to year changes in market conditions. 
[ INSERT TABLES 5 & 6 HERE ] 
NYSE vs. other markets  16
The final question that we choose to answer for the REITs concerns the liquidity of 
different markets. We divided our sample into NYSE and other markets and ran the 
regression of equation (7) on both sub-samples. The estimates conform closely to 
our expectations (please refer to Tables 7 and 8). NYSE REITs appear more liquid 
and more efficient in transaction costs throughout the period; the intercepts are 
closer to zero and the slopes are less steep than those in other markets. 
[ INSERT TABLES 7 & 8 HERE ] 
As mentioned above, however we note that large cap REITs would be expected to 
be more liquid than small cap REITs and that this effect might confound the market 
effect. In order to investigate this issue, for the years 2001 to 2005, we regress (1) 
the estimated liquidity parameters (the sum of the absolute slopes) and (2) the 
estimated transaction costs (the sum of the absolute intercepts), against size 
(represented by the log of total assets) and a market dummy. (There were 
insufficient observations of the non-NYSE REITs before 2001 to include earlier 
years). 
The results are given in Table 9 below. The regressions were estimated using a 
dummy (1,0 for the NYSE), size and the interaction between the market and size 
(which has the effect of estimating the change in slope of the size effect). Turning 
first to the regression of market liquidity, we note that in every year (apart from 
2003) the effect was that NYSE stocks were more liquid than non-NYSE stocks, 
large stocks were more liquid than small stocks but the effect of size was smaller 
for NYSE stocks. In other words, once a stock was listed on the NYSE, the size 
effect was less important than if it was not quoted on the NYSE. Thus the NYSE 
provided liquidity more than might be expected from the size effect alone.  
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE ] 17
The transaction costs regressions show a similar picture. Costs are lower for NYSE 
stocks than for other markets and are lower for large companies. However the 
effect of being on the NYSE is that transaction costs is less pronounced than it 
would be if the stocks were traded on other markets. 
7. Perspective on Results from a UK viewpoint 
In order to show the robustness of our technique, we collected daily data from the 
UK market referring to 37 major property companies composing the FTSE 350 real 
estate sector index. DataStream was the main data source for all types of 
information used in our analysis and we were able to obtain stock prices (total 
returns), trading volumes (i.e. sum of the value of all transactions taking place on 
any day
7) and bid and ask prices at the end of each day. In the UK throughout the 
late 1980s there was a boom in real estate with considerable activity in the market, 
but after the reaction in the early 1990s when real estate lost much of its perceived 
attractiveness, the period saw some shrinkage of the real estate sector since 
several companies were subject to private equity or management buy-outs as the 
property companies were seen to under-perform, (in terms of capital values), their 
estimated value of property held within their portfolio. A significant difference in 
price changes could be observed from 2003 onwards, when property companies 
started to become more attractive than other equities (the index increased from a 
value of 150 at the end of 2002 to a value of 350 at the end of 2005). 
In order to contrast the UK and US real estate sector, we show Figure 7 which 
presents the reported spreads for both markets. Surprisingly, there is some 
common movement in reported spreads over the first part of the period; spreads 
fall in the UK market from a high in 1992 to 1994 where they remain with minor 
changes for the rest of the period.  
7 Since trading volumes are collected in British Sterling, UK results are not “directly” comparable to 
US figures. 18
[ INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE ] 
In the UK market we could potentially run 520 regressions (40 property companies 
* 13 years) but like the US regressions, this was reduced because of the need to 
have a sufficient number of observations in each year. Table 10 presents the 
results for the regression – equation (7) – on the property companies in the sector 
for each year in the sample. The results show slightly decreasing intercept 
dummies, with absolute values passing from 1.25% in 1993 to 0.75% in 2005 for 
both positive and negative estimates thus representing slight falls in transaction 
costs. The steepness of the slope shows a substantial change between 1993 and 
1994 and an almost constant liquidity throughout the rest of the period albeit with a 
greater variability than for US REITs.  
[ INSERT TABLE 10 HERE ] 
We were unable to compute Roll’s estimates as the sign of the covariance was 
consistently positive, preventing us to obtain the suggested measure of effective 
spreads. Because of this result, we were unable to run the second regression of 
the inverse liquidity against the Roll estimator. Instead, we regressed the annual 
reported spreads against the inverse liquidity measure (the sum of the absolute 
slopes). Liquidity has been improving in the UK market, with both the reported 
spreads and inverse liquidity showing a decline over the period. This suggests that 
notwithstanding the difficulty of extracting the Roll estimator, the regression is 
indeed revealing characteristics of liquidity. From Table 11, which reports the 
results of the regression, it is clear that the relationship between the reported 
spreads and the inverse liquidity is weaker than in the US, but still significant at the 
10% level. 
[ INSERT TABLE 11 HERE ] 19
8. Conclusions 
Data availability is an issue that inhibits some research into market microstructure, 
but in this paper we have developed a simple technique which, when used on daily 
stock price returns, appears to be consistent with the results of previous research 
obtained using transaction-level data. Whilst we do not pretend that our technique 
is superior to that of using transaction-based data, our results are consistent with 
those of previous researchers and shed light upon the behaviour of market liquidity 
or market depth over the relatively long period since 1993. 
We show that liquidity improved dramatically from 1993 to 1994 in the US REIT 
sector and as previous researchers have suggested, the improvements resulted 
largely from the introduction of new REITs. The degree of liquidity is related to both 
the size of REITs and the market on which their stocks are traded but the NYSE 
appeared to offer more liquidity than might have been expected for the larger 
companies traded on it. Although we reveal a similar trend in the UK, the statistical 
results of the UK data are less informative since the Roll estimator of effective 
spreads was not consistent with the data. There is however a common feature with 
the US: spreads fell and liquidity improved for real estate securities during the early 
1990s and have changed rather less over the period since.20
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Appendix 1: Figures 
























































































































Figure 4: Regression Estimates for Intercept Dummies (including and excluding the 
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Figure 5: Regression Estimates for Slope Dummies (including and excluding the 
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Appendix 2: Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of returns and volumes for US REITs (1993-2005) 
Cross-sectional Cross-sectional No. of
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation REITs
1993 0.04% 0.14% 120,008 591,199 68
1994 -0.03% 0.11% 41,562 44,968 95
1995 0.03% 0.18% 46,070 82,480 100
1996 0.06% 0.13% 58,820 68,465 106
1997 0.04% 0.20% 80,617 90,085 122
1998 -0.07% 0.18% 89,723 110,565 130
1999 -0.07% 0.09% 96,745 123,243 134
2000 0.03% 0.10% 101,340 128,090 134
2001 0.04% 0.11% 137,099 204,805 135
2002 0.00% 0.12% 164,381 233,229 143
2003 0.11% 0.09% 185,007 254,117 154
2004 0.10% 0.33% 225,361 266,995 174
2005 0.00% 0.22% 230,464 281,158 183
Average Average
Returns Volumes30
Table 2: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in US (1993-2005) 
179 0.61 -0.003 -0.022 0.011 -0.001 -0.010 0.010 0.000 2005
166 0.61 -0.014 -0.025 0.022 -0.014 -0.008 0.010 0.000 2004
150 0.62 -0.036 -0.013 0.002 0.007 -0.009 0.011 -0.001 2003
137 0.59 0.009 -0.025 0.006 0.000 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2002
130 0.59 -0.027 -0.028 0.022 -0.001 -0.011 0.013 0.000 2001
131 0.66 -0.035 -0.031 0.033 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 2000
129 0.65 -0.025 -0.023 0.033 0.004 -0.015 0.014 0.000 1999
125 0.59 0.008 -0.008 0.025 0.000 -0.015 0.015 0.000 1998
113 0.67 -0.010 -0.003 0.029 -0.003 -0.014 0.014 0.000 1997
99 0.72 -0.013 -0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.016 0.015 0.000 1996
98 0.74 -0.015 -0.033 0.053 0.001 -0.017 0.017 0.000 1995
90 0.73 -0.011 -0.069 0.025 0.001 -0.019 0.020 0.000 1994





















179 0.61 -0.003 -0.022 0.011 -0.001 -0.010 0.010 0.000 2005
166 0.61 -0.014 -0.025 0.022 -0.014 -0.008 0.010 0.000 2004
150 0.62 -0.036 -0.013 0.002 0.007 -0.009 0.011 -0.001 2003
137 0.59 0.009 -0.025 0.006 0.000 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2002
130 0.59 -0.027 -0.028 0.022 -0.001 -0.011 0.013 0.000 2001
131 0.66 -0.035 -0.031 0.033 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 2000
129 0.65 -0.025 -0.023 0.033 0.004 -0.015 0.014 0.000 1999
125 0.59 0.008 -0.008 0.025 0.000 -0.015 0.015 0.000 1998
113 0.67 -0.010 -0.003 0.029 -0.003 -0.014 0.014 0.000 1997
99 0.72 -0.013 -0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.016 0.015 0.000 1996
98 0.74 -0.015 -0.033 0.053 0.001 -0.017 0.017 0.000 1995
90 0.73 -0.011 -0.069 0.025 0.001 -0.019 0.020 0.000 1994
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Table 3: Proportion of Significant parameter estimates in the Regression 
Positive λ λ λ λ1 1 1 1 Negative λ λ λ λ2 2 2 2 Positive α α α α1 1 1 1 Negative α α α α2 2 2 2
1993  32.8%  23.0%  96.7%  98.4% 
1994  24.4%  21.1%  100.0%  100.0% 
1995  33.7%  20.4%  99.0%  99.0% 
1996  28.3%  14.1%  100.0%  100.0% 
1997  18.6%  15.9%  93.8%  94.7% 
1998  15.2%  7.2%  68.8%  78.4% 
1999  27.1%  13.2%  77.5%  83.7% 
2000  16.0%  17.6%  79.4%  77.9% 
2001  6.9%  10.8%  49.2%  42.3% 
2002  2.2%  5.8%  35.0%  28.5% 
2003  8.7%  8.0%  34.7%  34.0% 
2004  3.6%  6.6%  28.3%  27.7% 
2005  1.7%  3.9%  30.7%  30.7% 32
Table 4: Regression of Roll Annual Spreads against Inverse Liquidity Estimator 
(1993-2005) 
St  =  w0 + w1 Σ λ i,t  + et
 W 0 W 1  
  Coefficient  0.655  4.706 




      
  F-test  14.6  Prob. 0.0028 33
Table 5: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in US – Old REITs (1993-
2005) 
50 0.61 -0.009 -0.063 0.029 0.000 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2005
50 0.62 -0.019 -0.042 0.048 0.001 -0.009 0.011 0.000 2004
50 0.63 -0.040 -0.022 0.024 -0.002 -0.008 0.013 -0.002 2003
47 0.60 0.008 -0.035 0.013 -0.001 -0.011 0.013 0.000 2002
48 0.61 -0.022 -0.021 0.040 0.001 -0.015 0.017 0.000 2001
49 0.66 -0.037 -0.060 0.059 0.001 -0.017 0.017 0.000 2000
47 0.66 -0.012 -0.017 0.023 -0.001 -0.012 0.012 0.000 1999
48 0.62 -0.005 -0.013 0.041 0.000 -0.017 0.015 0.000 1998
48 0.67 -0.017 -0.008 0.014 0.001 -0.015 0.014 0.000 1997
48 0.73 -0.013 -0.018 0.016 -0.001 -0.017 0.017 0.000 1996
50 0.76 -0.012 -0.067 0.092 0.001 -0.019 0.019 0.000 1995
49 0.74 -0.013 -0.132 0.054 0.001 -0.021 0.022 0.000 1994





















50 0.61 -0.009 -0.063 0.029 0.000 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2005
50 0.62 -0.019 -0.042 0.048 0.001 -0.009 0.011 0.000 2004
50 0.63 -0.040 -0.022 0.024 -0.002 -0.008 0.013 -0.002 2003
47 0.60 0.008 -0.035 0.013 -0.001 -0.011 0.013 0.000 2002
48 0.61 -0.022 -0.021 0.040 0.001 -0.015 0.017 0.000 2001
49 0.66 -0.037 -0.060 0.059 0.001 -0.017 0.017 0.000 2000
47 0.66 -0.012 -0.017 0.023 -0.001 -0.012 0.012 0.000 1999
48 0.62 -0.005 -0.013 0.041 0.000 -0.017 0.015 0.000 1998
48 0.67 -0.017 -0.008 0.014 0.001 -0.015 0.014 0.000 1997
48 0.73 -0.013 -0.018 0.016 -0.001 -0.017 0.017 0.000 1996
50 0.76 -0.012 -0.067 0.092 0.001 -0.019 0.019 0.000 1995
49 0.74 -0.013 -0.132 0.054 0.001 -0.021 0.022 0.000 1994
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Table 6: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in US – New REITs (1993-
2005) 
129 0.61 0.000 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.009 0.009 0.000 2005
116 0.61 -0.012 -0.018 0.010 -0.021 -0.007 0.010 0.000 2004
100 0.61 -0.036 -0.009 0.005 0.000 -0.008 0.010 0.000 2003
90 0.59 0.009 -0.020 0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2002
82 0.58 -0.027 -0.015 0.007 0.000 -0.008 0.010 0.000 2001
82 0.66 -0.034 -0.014 0.018 0.000 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2000
81 0.65 -0.030 -0.011 0.018 0.005 -0.012 0.012 0.000 1999
76 0.57 0.016 -0.010 0.009 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 1998
63 0.66 -0.005 -0.006 0.004 0.000 -0.013 0.013 0.000 1997
51 0.71 -0.011 -0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.013 0.014 0.000 1996
47 0.72 -0.019 -0.007 0.003 0.000 -0.014 0.014 0.000 1995
39 0.71 -0.006 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 1994





















129 0.61 0.000 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.009 0.009 0.000 2005
116 0.61 -0.012 -0.018 0.010 -0.021 -0.007 0.010 0.000 2004
100 0.61 -0.036 -0.009 0.005 0.000 -0.008 0.010 0.000 2003
90 0.59 0.009 -0.020 0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2002
82 0.58 -0.027 -0.015 0.007 0.000 -0.008 0.010 0.000 2001
82 0.66 -0.034 -0.014 0.018 0.000 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2000
81 0.65 -0.030 -0.011 0.018 0.005 -0.012 0.012 0.000 1999
76 0.57 0.016 -0.010 0.009 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 1998
63 0.66 -0.005 -0.006 0.004 0.000 -0.013 0.013 0.000 1997
51 0.71 -0.011 -0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.013 0.014 0.000 1996
47 0.72 -0.019 -0.007 0.003 0.000 -0.014 0.014 0.000 1995
39 0.71 -0.006 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 1994
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Table 7: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in US – NYSE REITs 
(1993-2005) 
127 0.61 0.011 -0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.000 2005
116 0.62 -0.007 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.008 0.000 2004
103 0.62 -0.033 -0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.009 -0.001 2003
99 0.59 0.028 -0.007 0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.008 0.000 2002
96 0.59 -0.019 -0.010 0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.008 0.000 2001
96 0.64 -0.029 -0.010 0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.010 0.000 2000
95 0.65 -0.012 -0.007 0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.009 0.000 1999
94 0.59 0.018 -0.007 0.008 0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.000 1998
87 0.66 -0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.000 1997
80 0.72 -0.009 -0.001 0.007 0.000 -0.012 0.012 0.000 1996
78 0.73 -0.010 -0.030 0.036 0.000 -0.013 0.013 0.000 1995
74 0.71 -0.007 -0.039 0.031 0.001 -0.015 0.014 0.000 1994





















127 0.61 0.011 -0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.000 2005
116 0.62 -0.007 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.008 0.000 2004
103 0.62 -0.033 -0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.009 -0.001 2003
99 0.59 0.028 -0.007 0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.008 0.000 2002
96 0.59 -0.019 -0.010 0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.008 0.000 2001
96 0.64 -0.029 -0.010 0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.010 0.000 2000
95 0.65 -0.012 -0.007 0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.009 0.000 1999
94 0.59 0.018 -0.007 0.008 0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.000 1998
87 0.66 -0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.000 1997
80 0.72 -0.009 -0.001 0.007 0.000 -0.012 0.012 0.000 1996
78 0.73 -0.010 -0.030 0.036 0.000 -0.013 0.013 0.000 1995
74 0.71 -0.007 -0.039 0.031 0.001 -0.015 0.014 0.000 1994
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Table 8: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in US – Non-NYSE REITs 
(1993-2005) 
52 0.60 -0.036 -0.046 0.019 -0.002 -0.016 0.017 0.000 2005
50 0.61 -0.031 -0.052 0.034 -0.047 -0.013 0.015 0.000 2004
47 0.61 -0.045 -0.037 0.025 0.024 -0.015 0.016 0.000 2003
38 0.61 -0.040 -0.069 0.016 0.001 -0.025 0.028 0.000 2002
34 0.60 -0.043 -0.038 0.054 0.001 -0.022 0.024 0.000 2001
35 0.69 -0.054 -0.055 0.070 0.001 -0.027 0.028 0.000 2000
34 0.67 -0.061 -0.069 0.040 0.017 -0.028 0.029 0.000 1999
31 0.58 -0.024 -0.026 0.079 0.000 -0.028 0.029 0.000 1998
26 0.70 -0.022 -0.021 0.097 -0.009 -0.028 0.028 0.000 1997
19 0.72 -0.029 -0.038 0.021 -0.006 -0.032 0.031 0.000 1996
20 0.77 -0.036 -0.044 0.117 0.003 -0.033 0.035 0.000 1995
16 0.80 -0.018 -0.215 0.047 -0.001 -0.033 0.036 0.000 1994





















52 0.60 -0.036 -0.046 0.019 -0.002 -0.016 0.017 0.000 2005
50 0.61 -0.031 -0.052 0.034 -0.047 -0.013 0.015 0.000 2004
47 0.61 -0.045 -0.037 0.025 0.024 -0.015 0.016 0.000 2003
38 0.61 -0.040 -0.069 0.016 0.001 -0.025 0.028 0.000 2002
34 0.60 -0.043 -0.038 0.054 0.001 -0.022 0.024 0.000 2001
35 0.69 -0.054 -0.055 0.070 0.001 -0.027 0.028 0.000 2000
34 0.67 -0.061 -0.069 0.040 0.017 -0.028 0.029 0.000 1999
31 0.58 -0.024 -0.026 0.079 0.000 -0.028 0.029 0.000 1998
26 0.70 -0.022 -0.021 0.097 -0.009 -0.028 0.028 0.000 1997
19 0.72 -0.029 -0.038 0.021 -0.006 -0.032 0.031 0.000 1996
20 0.77 -0.036 -0.044 0.117 0.003 -0.033 0.035 0.000 1995
16 0.80 -0.018 -0.215 0.047 -0.001 -0.033 0.036 0.000 1994
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Table 9: Regression of (1) Inverse Liquidity (sum of the slopes, Panel A) and 
Transaction Costs (sum of the intercepts, Panel B) against (Log-)Size and Market 
Dummy 
Constant D Nyse Size Nyse*size Constant D Nyse Size Nyse*size
2001 1.24*** -0.995*** -0.09*** 0.074*** 10.15 0.347*** -0.304*** -0.024*** 0.022*** 17.30
4.91 -2.78 -4.40 2.72 6.47 -4.01 -5.57 3.85
2002 0.66*** -0.518*** -0.047*** 0.038*** 14.69 0.348*** -0.312*** -0.024*** 0.022*** 14.95
5.95 -3.23 -5.29 3.15 5.99 -3.72 -5.13 3.55
2003 0.41* -0.35 -0.031* 0.03 1.28 0.226*** -0.171*** -0.016*** 0.013*** 22.37
1.91 -1.09 -1.77 1.12 7.93 -3.93 -6.82 3.93
2004 1.057*** -0.982*** -0.074*** 0.069*** 11.27 0.171*** -0.13*** -0.011*** 0.009*** 24.18
5.04 -3.10 -4.45 2.95 8.37 -4.22 -7.03 4.15
2005 0.911*** -0.865*** -0.064*** 0.061*** 11.91 0.214*** -0.157*** -0.015*** 0.012*** 28.79
5.47 -3.33 -4.94 3.24 9.48 -4.46 -8.29 4.53
* Significant at 90% confidence level
** Significant at 95% confidence level
*** Significant at 99% confidence level
Panel A:   λ Panel B:   α
F-stat F-stat
Coefficients Coefficients38
Table 10: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in UK (1993-2005) 
39 0.57 -0.011 0.037 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2005
35 0.57 -0.036 0.034 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2004
32 0.55 -0.029 0.055 0.000 -0.010 0.011 0.000 2003
32 0.54 -0.013 0.032 0.000 -0.011 0.011 0.000 2002
32 0.53 -0.030 0.052 0.000 -0.010 0.008 0.000 2001
26 0.53 -0.023 0.015 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2000
25 0.56 -0.047 0.095 0.000 -0.009 0.011 0.000 1999
25 0.57 -0.041 0.016 0.000 -0.009 0.009 0.000 1998
20 0.56 -0.041 0.075 0.000 -0.011 0.013 0.000 1997
18 0.70 -0.015 0.044 0.000 -0.009 0.010 0.000 1996
20 0.72 -0.048 0.050 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.000 1995
19 0.67 -0.021 0.048 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.000 1994


















39 0.57 -0.011 0.037 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2005
35 0.57 -0.036 0.034 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2004
32 0.55 -0.029 0.055 0.000 -0.010 0.011 0.000 2003
32 0.54 -0.013 0.032 0.000 -0.011 0.011 0.000 2002
32 0.53 -0.030 0.052 0.000 -0.010 0.008 0.000 2001
26 0.53 -0.023 0.015 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2000
25 0.56 -0.047 0.095 0.000 -0.009 0.011 0.000 1999
25 0.57 -0.041 0.016 0.000 -0.009 0.009 0.000 1998
20 0.56 -0.041 0.075 0.000 -0.011 0.013 0.000 1997
18 0.70 -0.015 0.044 0.000 -0.009 0.010 0.000 1996
20 0.72 -0.048 0.050 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.000 1995
19 0.67 -0.021 0.048 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.000 1994
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Table 11: UK Regression of Reported Annual Spreads against Inverse Liquidity 
Estimator (1993-2005) 
RSt  =  w0 + w1 Σ λ i,t  + et
 W 0 W 1  
  Coefficient  0.011  3.04 




    
  F-test  3.36  Prob. 0.096 